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Abstract 
A digital signature is a reliable electronic method of signing electronic documents 
that provides the recipient with a way to verify the sender, determine that the 
content of the document has not been altered since it was signed and prevent the 
sender from repudiating the fact that he or she signed and sent the electronic 
document. 
This thesis mainly discusses the ElGarnal signature scheme, especially on the 
f()rgery of tliis signature scheme and its variations. There are some ways to 
f.orge an ElGarnal signature, without knowing the private key of the signer, if 
the parameters used in the signature scheme are not carefully chosen. One of 
this forgery is done l)y the Bleiclienbacher's attack. 
The other way of forging signature is to break the discrete logarithm. There 
are some algorithms to solve the discrete logarithm problem, such as l)aby-step 
giant-step, Pollard's p, Pohlig Hellman, index-calculus and the mirnber fiekl 
sieve. This thesis chooses quadratic field in the number field sieve to solve the 
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Every clay, people sign their names to contracts, cheques, credit card receipts and 
other documents, showing that they are the originator of these documents. The 
signature allows other people to verify that a particular document did indeed 
originate frorn the signer. This is the vise of the handwritten signature. 
In general, a signature should have the following properties: 
1. The signature is authentic. The signature convinces the document's recip-
ient that the signer deliberately signed tlie document. 
2. The signature is uiiforgeable. The signature is proof that the signer, and 
110 one else, deliberately signed the document. 
3. The signed document is unalterable. After the document is signed, it 
cannot be altered without generating new signature. 
4. The signature cannot be repudiated. Once the document is signed, the 
signer caimot later claim that he or she didn't sign it. 
1 
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How can we implement the handwritten signature in the digital world? Can 
we just scan the handwritten signature and append it with the docuinent? Of 
course no! Since the scanned signature is just a computer file, it is trivial to 
duplicate. Second, it would be easy to cut and paste a scanned image from one 
document to another (lociiment. Third, computer files can be modified after 
they are 'signed'. Therefore, it is not a good solution. 
So, what should we do? Thanks to the advance of cryptography. Before explain-
ing how we can imitate handwritten signature in the digital world, let's have 
some introduction to cryptography first. In traditional cryptography, if two par-
ties want to coinmiinicate in a secure way, both the sender and the receiver agree 
011 a secret key; the sender uses the secret key to encrypt the message, and the 
receiver uses the same secret key to decrypt the message. This method is known 
as secret key or symmetric cryptography. The eavesdropper, without knowing 
the secret key, cannot decrypt the message. 
Can we use this symmetric cryptography to imitate handwritten signature, that 
is, the signer uses the secret key to 'sign' the message and the receiver uses the 
same key to 'verify，the signature? The answer is no. Since the receiver must 
know the secret key in order to 'verify' the signature, it means that the receiver 
can also use this secret key to 'sigii' the signature. Therefore, forgery can be 
easily implemented if we use this scheme. It is still acceptable if this scheme is 
only iised between two trusted parties. However, in the digital world, where we 
have to sign document to many people, we must prepare different secret keys 
for different people - it is unacceptable. 
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Such problem cannot be solved until 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellrnan 
8] introduced the concept of public-key cryptography. In the public-key cryp-
tosystem, each person has a pair of keys, one key is called the public key and 
the other is called the private key. The public key is published, while the private 
key is kept secret. 
But someone will ask, can we easily deduce the private key from the public key? 
No! Why? In the public key cryptosystern, we caii easily compute the public key 
fi.om the private key (since it is very likely that these two keys are the same), but 
it, is infeasible to compute the private key from the public key. It is something 
like a one-way function: A one-way function is a mathematical function that it 
is significantly easier to compute in one direction (the forward direction) than in 
tlie opposite direction (the inverse direction). It might be possible, for example, 
to compute the function in the forward direction in seconds but to compute its 
inverse coiild take years, niilleiinia, if at all possible. 
How can it be done? It can be done by the well known hard problems in cryp-
tography: integer factorisation, discrete logarithm and elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm. Here is an example, it is easy to compute 101 x 103, right? It is 
10403. However, if I say, factor the number 10403，can we easily find its factors? 
Still yes, since 10403 is still a small number, we can find its factors hy trial 
division. However, if I ask you to factor a number that is 100-，200-digit long, 
is it still easy to find its factors? No! That is one of the hard problems, called 
integer factorisation. 
With the help of the public key cryptosysteiri, we can implement a signature 
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scheme in the digital world, called digital signature. The sender uses his private 
to 'sign' the document, and the receiver uses the corresponding public key to 
'verify' the signature. 
This thesis will discuss one of the signature schemes, call ElGamal signature 
scheme, which is a, signature scheme based on the hard problem of discrete loga-
rithm. What is this signature scheme about? Let's refer to the figure 1.1. First 
the signer, say, Alice, applies a hash function to the message, creating a so-called 
message digest. What is a hash function? A hash functioii is a mathematical 
function that takes an input rn and returns a fixed-size string, called the hashed 
value. Often, the input string m is much longer than the hashed value. Given 
tlie hashed value, it is infeasible to find another rn，such that they have the 
same hashed value. MD2, MD5 and Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) are some 
well-known hash functions. 
So why should we use the hash function? It is because of two reasons, one is the 
message digest is generally much smaller than the original message; therefore, we 
can save sorne bandwidth in the transmission and save sonie computing power 
iii handling the message afterwards. The other reason is because of the security 
issues, which will be discussed in chapter 3. Alice then uses her private key, 
together with the message digest, generates two values r and s by the discrete 
logarithm. We will call these two values a signature pair afterwards. This is the 
signing process of the signature scheme. Alice will then send this signature pair, 
together with the message to the receiver, say, Bob. 
When Bob obtains the signature pair and the message, he does the following to 
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Figure 1.1: digital signature signing process 
verify the signature. First, lie also applies the hash function to the message and 
gets the value of the message digest. Then, he uses the public key of Alice, the 
message digest and the signature pair r and s, to compute some values. If these 
values are valid, then he will accept the signature; otherwise, he will reject the 
signature. The flow chart is shown in figure 1.2. 
Is this signature scheme authentic? Yes, since only Alice has the private key, 
only she can sign the document with her private key. Deducing the private from 
the public key is hard, so once we received this signature, we can assure that 
it is come from Alice. With the same reason, once the message is signed and 
the signature is generated, Alice cannot deny signing the document. Since the 
hash function is used in the signing process, one cannot alter the content of the 
document (since it is infeasible to find another document which can generate 
the same hash value). 
Is this signature scheme iinforgeable? In reality, handwritten signature can be 
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Figure 1.2: digital signature verifying process 
forged. Signatures can be lifted from one piece of paper and moved to another, 
aiid (lociimeiits can be altered after signing. In digital signature, forgery can 
also be possible. One rnethod is to compute the private key from the public 
key. Yet I have said that the ElGamal signature scheme is based on the hard 
problem called discrete logarithm, there are still some algorithms to speed up 
the cracking. However, until now, there are no algorithm can solve this hard 
problern in a reasonable time. These algorithms will be discussed iii chapter 2 
and 4. The other method is to forge the signature without knowing the private 
key. In chapter 3’ we will discuss that if the parameters used in the ElGamal 
signature scheme are not carefully chosen, the signature scheme will l>e viiliier-
able to several attacks, one of them is the topic of this thesis - Bleichenbacher's 
6 
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attack. We will extend this Bleichenbacher's attack to other variations of ElGa-
nial signature scheme. 
If we choose the parameters carefully, this signature scheme is not likely to be 
forged. One of the secure signature schemes is Digital Signature Standard. The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), iii cooperation with 
the National Security Agency, proposes DSS which is the digital authentication 
standard of the U.S. goveriiirient. This standard will also be discussed in the 
later part of chapter 3. 
What is the use of digital signature? With the digital signature, we can sign 
t,he document with ovir private key and others can easily verify the document 
with our public key. One of the uses is in email system. Since the 'narne' and 
'email address，of an email are not authentic, we cannot assiire that an email 
from "Alice" is really come from Alice. With the help of digital signature, once 
we have received the signature pair and the original message of Alice, we believe 
that the sender is Alice. 
Digital tirnestarnps rnay be used in connection with digital signatures to bind a 
document to a particular time of origin. It is not sufficient to just note the date 
in the message, since dates on computers can be easily manipulated. It is bet-





This chapter will give the background information necessary for further discus-
sion. Since most of the material discussed in this thesis is about cryptography, 
and rriany cryptographic algorithms are based oii the theory of abstract algebra, 
siich as group, ring, field. Therefore, the first section will be about abstract 
algebra. 
2.1 Abstract Algebra 
Before the introduction of abstract algebra, some terms must be defined {binary 
operation, com,rnutativity, associativity). 
Definition 2.1.1 A lnnary operation * on a set S is a mapping from S x S to 
S. 
Definition 2.1.2 A binary operation * is commutative if it satisfies 
a * b = h * a 
8 
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Definition 2.1.3 A bmary operation * is associative if it satisfies 
(a * b) * b = a * (b * c) 
2.1.1 Group 
Group is the basic of the cryptography. Many cryptographic algorithms are 
based on the group theory. The definition of group and some examples will be 
given here. 
Definition 2.1.4 A group G is a nonempty set together with a bina,ry operation 
* which satisfies the following properties: 
• * is associafAve (a,ssociativity). 
• There is an element e in G such that a * e = a and e * a = a for every 
dement a m G (the element e is called the identity element ofG). 
• For every element a in G, there is an element x in G such that a * x = e 
and X * a = e (The element x is called the inverse o.fa). 
The group just defined rnay be represented by the symbol (G, *). This notation 
makes it explicit that the group consists of the set G ancl the binary operation 
*• If there is no danger of confusion, we shall denote the group simply with the 
letter G. 
Here is an example of a group - the group of integers inodiilo 6. This groiip 
consists of six elements, 
{ 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 } 
9 
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and a binary operation called addition modulo 6, + . Table 2.1 shows the oper-
ations. 
It means that 0 + 1 = 1, 2 + 3 = 5, 4 + 3 二 1. We often use Ze to denote this 
+ 0 1 2 3 4 5 
~0~~0 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 2 3 4 5 0 
2 2 3 4 5 0 1 
3 3 4 5 0 1 2 
4 4 5 0 1 2 3 
5 5 0 1 2 3 4 
Table 2.1: Operation table for integers modulo 6 
groiip. In general, the set Z„,，with the binary operation of addition modulo n, 
forms a group. However, the set Z„ , with the binary operation of multiplication 
iriodiilo n, is not a group. 
Definition 2.1.5 A group G is called an Abelian group if the commutafAve law 
holds m the group. 
Definition 2.1.6 A subgroup H of a group G is a group such that the set H is 
a subset ofG. 
Definition 2.1.7 A finite group is a group G which contains a finite number of 
elements. 
2.1.2 Ring 
A ring R is a nonempty set together with two binary operations, narnely, addition 
+ aii(l multiplication * which satisfies the following properties: 
1 0 
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1. R with addition alone is an Abelian group. 
2. Multiplication is associative. 
3. Multiplication is distributive over addition. That is, for all a,b, and c in 
R, 
a * (b + c) = a * b + a * c 
and 
(b + c) * a = b * a + c * a 
Since R with addition alone is an Abelian group, there is in R a neutral element 
for addition: it is called the zero element and is written 0. Also, every element 
has an additive inverse called its negative; the negative of a is denoted by —a. 
Subtraction is defined by 
a — b = a + {-b) 
2.1.3 Field 
Definition 2.1.8 A field is a nonempty set F together with two binary oper-
ations, namely, addition + and multiplication * which satisfies the following 
properties: 
1. F with addition alone is an Ahelian group 
忍.F — {0} with multiplication is an Ahelian group, where 0 is the identity 
element for addition. 
3. Multiplication is distributive over addition. That is, for all a,b, and c in 
R, 
a * {b + c) = a * b + a * c 
11 
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and 
{b + c) * a = b * a + c * a 
The set Zp under the usual operations of modulo addition and modulo multipli-
cation forms a field, provided that p is a prime number . 
Definition 2.1.9 A finite field is a field F which contains a finite number of 
elements. 
2.1.4 Useful Theorems in Number Theory 
There are two useful theorems which are frequently used in number theory: they 
are the Chinese Remainder Theorem and Euler's Theorem. 
Chinese Remainder Theorem Let n^, ri2, . . . , n^ be pairwise relatively prime 
integers, then the system of sirnviltaneoiis congruences 
.T = (ii (mod rii) 
X = ci,2 (mod ri2) 
工=o,k (rnod rik) (2.1) 
has a unique solution rnodulo n = n1n2 . . . n^. The solution x to the simultane-
ous congruences can be computed as 
k 
X = J 2 ( i i N M (mod n) (2.2) 
i=l 
wliere 
A^z = n/n, (2.3) 
1 2 
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and 
M, = N - ^ (mod n,) (2.4) 
Euler 's Theorem 
Theorem 2.1.1 Ifa and m, are integers such that gcd(a,, m) = 1，then o.^^^^ = 1 
(mod m), where 4>{m) is the Euler's (j)-funcMon. 
Corollary 2.1.1 If p is prime, then the number ofinvertible elements in the 
complete residue system, modulo p is p - 1，i.e., 4>{p) = p— 1. Therefore, for any 
a + 0 (mod p), a^~^ = 1 (m,od p). 
2.2 Discrete Logarithm 
Discrete logarithm is one of the hard problems in the cryptography field. It is dif-
ficult to solve because until now, there is no polynomial running time algorithm 
to solve the discrete logarithm problem. Many algorithms (will be discussed 
later) runs sub-exponential time. They are not as fast as polynomial time algo-
rithms, yet they are considerably faster than exponential tirne methods. 
Definition 2.2.1 If G is a finite group, the order of G is the number of ele-
ments in G. 
Definition 2.2.2 A cyclic group G of order n is a group defined by an element 
tt (the generator), where the powers ofthe generator (a, a^, .. .，a^) are unique. 
Definition 2.2.3 Let G be a finite cyclic group of order n, a be the generator 
ofG, and P G G, the discrete logarithm problem, is to find an integer x, 0 < x < 
n — 1，such that a^ = |3. 
1 3 
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In general, a discrete logarithm problem involves a prirne number p and a genera-
tor «. The group used is a multiplication group Z*. Then the discrete logarithm 
problem becomes: 
Given /;, a and /3, find an x such that /3 = a^ (mod p) or solve the 
discrete logarithm logo^  ^. 
2.3 Solving Discrete Logarithm 
This section will discuss some methods to solve the discrete logarithm problem. 
2.3.1 Exhaustive Search 
It is the naive method to solve the discrete logarithm. It tries all the possibilities 
of X until we find one that a^ = p (mod p). 
Algorithm Compute a � , a^, a^, until we find an i such that a^ = /5 (mod /;). 
Example The element a = 19 is a generator of the group G of ZJg^. Find x 
such that 19^ = 82 (mod 191). 
Solution We try ?； = 0 , 1 . . . and finally we find that 19^ '^  = 82 (mod 191). 
Therefore, x = 19. (The intermediate steps are shown iii table 2.2) 
Since this method searches all the possibilities o f j ; , it takes 0 ( n ) multiplications. 
Owing to its complexity, it is only useful for a small n only. 
1 4 
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~ i II 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
“ W II 1 19 170 174 59 166 98 143 43 53 
“？； T o " T T 12 13 ~ W 15 — 16 17 l 8 ~ ~ 1 ^ 
—19?: II 52 33 54 71 12 37 130 178 135 82 
Table 2.2: Intermediate steps of exhaustive search algorithm 
2.3.2 Baby Step Giant Step 
The baby-step giant-step algorithm makes use of a time-memory trade-off to 
search an interval of length n for a discrete logarithm using only 0(\/n) opera-
tions. 
The idea of baby-step giant-step is: Let m 二�y^ where n is the order of a. 
We can write x = ini + j, where 0 < i,j < m. Hence, a^ = cy^^a-\ which implies 
^(tt,y - a^. 
Algorithm 
1. Set m = \/n. 
2. Construct a, table with entries (j, a^) for 0 < j < rri. 
3. For i = 0 to m — 1, 
(a) Set 7 = f ^ ( ^ a 1 . 
(b) If 7 = a^, then break and output x 二 im + j. 
(c) Else continue. 
In step 3(b), we will compare the value of 7 with a^. To facilitate the comparison, 
it is better to sort the colurnn aK Roughly speaking, it takes 0(^/n,) storage 
1 5 
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and 0 ( v ^ ) operations. 
Example Use the same example as section 2.3.1. 
Solution 
1. m =�v^l = 14 
2. Construct the table as in table 2.3. 
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
W 1 19 170 174 59 166 98 143 
?： ~ 8 ~ ~ 9 ~ ~ U T 11 T ^ " 13 ~ U 
19^ 43 53 52 33 54 71 12 
Table 2.3: Intermediate steps of baby-step giant-step algorithm 
3. Then we compute a~^^ = 16 (mod 191). We try z = 0 , l , . . . and obtain 
7 = 82 * 16^ = 166 (mod 191) where 166 = 19^. Therefore, we can 
calculate x by 1 * 14 + 5 = 19. Thus .x is solved. 
2.3.3 Pollard's rho 
Pollard's rho algorithm [20] is the best collision search algorithm. It gets its 
name because the algorithm produces a trail of numbers that when graphically 
represented with a line connecting successive elements, the trail looks like the 
Greek letter rho, ,). The objective of this algorithm is to find where the tail 
rneets the loop. 
Let f(x) be a polynomial with integer coefficients. Starting from 工(）=1, define 
1 6 
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a sequence of group elements xg, .xi,工2，. • • where 
y 
/3 • Xj, if x^  G Si, 
.T,;+i = ! [ x , ) = x\, if .T, G 52, (2.5) 
a • .T^ , if Xi G 5a 
\ 
for i > 0. The set 5i , S2 and S^ are chosen siich that they are of roughly equal 
size. 
This sequence in tiirn defines two sequences of integers flo, 0,1, 0,2, . . . and 60, 61, 
h2, . . . satisfying x,； = a^'P^' for i > 0, where ao = 0 and bo = 0: 
( 
(h, if Xi e 5 i , 
fl'i+i 二 2a,; mod n, if x, G S2 (2.6) 
� a , ; + 1 rnod n, if Xi G S3 
ancl 
f 
l)i + 1 mod n, if x^ G 5i 
:^+1 = 2h, mod n, if x^ e S2 (2.7) 
� k , if x-j G 5,3, 
where n is the order of the group. When an Xi is computed, it is compared 
with the other sequence elements Xj (for j = 0, 1， . . . , i — 1). If a collision is 
found, i.e., there exists a j such that x,； = Xj, we can probably solve the discrete 
logarithm problem. Since if we find a pair i and j such that x^ 二 Xj, then 
a"' fi'' = a ( i j p j . Taking logarithm to base a , we have 
a-i + h loga P = a] + bj log^ /3 (mod n) 
{k - bj) log^ P = a,j — a,i (mod n) 
log« P = g ^ ( m o d n ) (2.8) 
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It is not practical to keep track of all values of Xi. The Pollard's p method 
employs a clever procedure to detect a collision, called Floyd's cycle detecting 
algorithm. Instead of finding a collision of x^  and Xj, we find two elements Xi 
and X2i- If we find Xi = .¾, we can follow the similar argument as above and 
solve the discrete logarithm of log^ /3, where 
loga^ = ^ ^ (modn) (2.9) 
h — hi 
E x a m p l e The element a = 19 is a generator of the subgroup G of Z&3 of order 
n = 191. The discrete logarithm problem is to find an x such that a^ 二 336 
(mod 383). First, we have a = 19, |3 = 336, n = 191. Then we partition the set 
G into three subsets 5 i , S2, Ss according to this rule: 
X G Si if X 三 1 (mod 3) 
X E S2 if X 三 2 (mod 3) 
X e S3 if .T 三 3 (mod 3) (2.10) 
Using the Pollard's p algorithm, and setting x^ — 1, ao = 0 and bo = 0, we 
obtain table (2.4): 
Since we find a collision when i = 11, wliere an = 4, bu = 18, a22 = 89, 
b22 = 104. Then 
89 - 4 
logig336 = 18 — 104 ( m o d l 9 1 ) 
= 1 9 (mod 191) (2.11) 
2.3.4 Pohlig-Hellman 
Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [19] takes the advantage of the prime factorisation of 
p — 1. This algorithm is best understood by first considering the special case 
1 8 
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1 II Xj I a^ I bi X2i d2i /)2i 
T ^ ~ ^ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ^ m " ~ 0 Y~ 
2 294 0 2 330 0 8 
3 261 0 4 134 1 16 
4 330 0 8 116 3 16 
5 128 0 16 205 4 17 
6 134 1 16 9 5 18 
7 248 2 16 50 20 72 
8 116 3 16 161 21 73 
9 289 4 16 25 44 146 
10 205 4 17 293 88 103 
11 323 4 18 323 89 104 
Table 2.4: Intermediate steps of Pollard's p method 
when p = 2"' + 1. 
For p = 2"- + 1 
This algorithm is to find the binary expansion of x (6o, /)i, ..., bn-i) 
n-\ 
x = Y,kT 
i=0 
The least significant bit bo of.T is determined by raising P to the ( p - l ) / 2 = 2""^ 
power and applying the nile 
< 
, ’ � / � + 1 , bo = 0 
广 1 ) / 2 = (mod p) (2.12) 
i - 1 , bo = 1 
This fact is established by noting that, since a is primitive, 
o>-i)/2 = —1 (mod p) (2.13) 
and therefore, 
0(p-i)/2 = (^^)(p-D/2 = ( — 1广(niod p) (2.14) 
1 9 
Chapter 2 Background 
If .T is divisible by two, i.e., bo = 0, then (2.14) gives +1 ; otherwise, it gives - 1 . 
The next bit in the expansion of x is then determined by letting 
7 = /3a-bo = a$i (mod p) (2.15) 
where 
n-l 
xi = Y , b a ' (2.16) 
i=l 
To find the next bit /)i, we raise 7 to (p — 1)/4 = 2""'^ power and applying the 
rule 
( , . , , f +1, 61 = 0 
7(P-i)/4=<^ (modp) (2.17) 
-1, 、 = 1 
\ 
Reasoning as before, if x is divisible by four, i.e., bi = 0, then (2.17) will give 
+ 1; otherwise, it will give —1. 
In general, to find the bit b” we first must have 
7 = a^' ( m o d p) (2.18) 
where Xi is 
n-l 
x^  = Y , b , 2 ' (2.19) 
J=i 
Then we raise 7 to the m — th power where 
- = ^ ^ (2.20) 
and apply the rule 
y 
+ 1, h = 0 
7^' = (mod p) (2.21) 
i - 1 , k = 1 
2 0 
Chapter 2 Background 
For arbitrary primes 
Let the prirne factorisation of p — 1 is 
p - l = ^ 2 . . - l ) T , P i < 2 ) m (2.22) 
The algorithm is to find the value of x (mod p^') for i = 1，2,. . . , k and compute 
X via the Chinese Remainder Theorem. 
Consider the following expansion of x (mod p"'): 
r i i — l 
•T = [ b3pi (2.23) 
j=0 
where 0 < bj < p,； — 1. 
The least significant coefficient, bo, is detenniiied by raising /3 to the (p — l)/p^ 
power, 
0(P-i)M = ^(p-i)xM (mo(ip) 
= 7 f (inod p) 
= 者 ( m o d p ) (2.24) 
where 
7, = a(P-i)/P' (2.25) 
is a primitive p^-th root of unity. There are therefore only Pi possible values for 
0p-i)/pi (mod p), and the resultant value uniquely determines bo. 
To determine the next digit /)! in the base p^  expansion of x (mod p"') , we inust 
first have 
C 二 |3a-bo = o;A (mod p) (2.26) 
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where Xi is 
Tli — l 
•Ti = [ ~ r i . (2.27) 
,7 = 1 
and then raise ( to the (p — l)|p] power 
C(p-i)/p;2 二 f;j>-iWp? (mod p) 
= 7 产 ( m o d p) 
= 者 ( m o d p) (2.28) 
Again, there are only p^  possible values of ((”一”斤？ and this valid determines 6i. 
This process is continued to determine all the coefficients bj. 
Example 
1. The prime factorisation of p - 1 = 190 is 2 • 5 • 19 
2. (a) Compute Xi = x (mod 2) 
«95 二 i9(J5 (mod 191) 
= 1 9 0 (mod 191) 
/^ 95 二 8295 (mod 191) 
= 1 9 0 (mod 191) (2.29) 
Therefore, the coefficient bo = 1. Then xi = 1 (mod 2). 
(b) Compute X2 = x (mod 5) 
«38 = ig38 (mod 191) 
= 3 9 (mod 191) 
3^8 = 82.38 (mod 191) 
= 4 9 (mod 191) (2.30) 
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We use extensive search method to find the coefficient bo = 4. There-
fore, X2 = 4 (mod 5) 
(c) Compute x3 = x (mod 19) 
«10 = 19io (mod 191) 
二 52 (mod 191) 
� 1 0 = 82io (mod 191) 
二 1 (mod 191) (2.31) 
We use extensive search method to find the coefficient 60 — 0. There-
fore, .T,3 = 0 (mod 19) 
(d) Now, we have 
X = 1 (mod 2) 
X = 4 (mod 5) 
.T = 0 (mod 19) (2.32) 
Using Chinese Remainder Theorem, we find that x = 19. 
2.3.5 Index Calculus 
Algorithm 
1. Choose a subset S = {p1,p2, •. • ,Pt] of G 
2. (a) Select a random number k, 0 < k < n - 1, and compute a^ 
(b) Try to write n^ as a product of elements in 5: 
i 
o^' = X{iA\ c , > o 
T = 1 
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If successful, take logarithms of both sides of equation to obtain a 
linear relation 
t 
k = Y 1 Ci log„pi (mod p - 1). 
i=l 
(c) Repeat these steps until there are enough relations. 
3. Solve the above linear system and obtain log^ pi. 
4. (a) Select a random number k, 0 < k < p - 1, and compute /3 . a^. 
(b) Try to write /3 • a^ as a product of elements 'm S. So, 
t 
p . a ^ = Y [ p f ^ d, > 0. (2.33) 
i=l 
Repeat 4a until the attempt is successful. Then 
t 
log, P = Y . (k log« lh — k (mod p) (2.34) 
z=i 
Example Use the same example as in section 2.3.1, 
1. First, the factor base chosen is S = {2, 3，5, 7} 
2. We randomly generate k and obtain the following relations 
1920 mod 191 = 2 • 3 • 5 
i9i2 mod 191 二 2 • 3.3 
1992 mod 191 = 32 • 5 
1 9 舰 mod 191 = 23 . 3 • 5 
1 9 " i mo(l 191 = 2 • 3 • 7 (2.35) 
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3. Taking the logarithms of both sides, 
20 = log 2 + log 3 + log 5 (mod 190) 
12 = log2 + 31og3 (rnod 190) 
92 = 21og3 + log5 (mod 190) 
108 = 3 log 2 + log 3 + log 5 (mod 190) 
141 = log 2 + log 3 + log 7 (mod 190) (2.36) 
4. Then solve the system of linear equations with four unknowns 
log2 = 44 
log3 = 116 
log5 = 50 
log7 = 171 (2.37) 
5. Suppose that the integer k = 65 is selected. Since 
^ • a^ = 82 • 1965 (mod 191) 
= 8 1 (mod 191) 
= 3 4 (mod 191) (2.38) 
6. It follows that 
logi9 82 + 65 = 4 logi9 3 (mod 190) 
logi9 82 = 4 • 116 — 65 (mod 190) 
= 1 9 (2.39) 
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Forging ElGamal Signature 
This chapter will first discuss the original ElGamal signature schemes and ana-
lyze the security of this signature scheme. In [3], it shows that there are some 
security risks in the ElGarnal signature scheme if the parameters are not care-
fully chosen. In this case, forgery is possible even that the adversary doesn't 
know the private key of the signer. I will extend such type of forgery to the 
variations of the ElGarnal signature scheme. The last part will discuss a vari-
ant of the ElGamal signature scheme that is the digital authentication standard 
adopted by the U.S. government - it is Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 
3.1 ElGamal Signature Scheme 
ElGamal signature scheme is based on the discrete logarithm problem (which is 
discussed in chapter 2). This scheme mainly involves foiir steps: 1. Choose the 
public parameters p and a, these parameters can be shared among several users. 
2. Generate the key pair (private key and public key) of the signer. 3. Given a 
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message m, generate a pair (r,s), which is called the signature on message m. 
4. Verify the signature pair on the message. 
Public Parameters 
1. Choose a large prime number p, and the multiplicative group Z*, 
where the group operation is multiplication modulo p. 
2. Choose a generator a of the multiplicative group Z*. 
3. Publish p and a. 
Key Generation 
1. Randomly generate an integer x, where 1 < x < p — 2. 
2. Compute y = a^ (mod p). 
3. Private key: x 
Public key: y. 
Signature Generation 
1. Select a random number k, 1 < k < p — 2, such that g c d ( A : , p - l ) = 1. 
2. Compute r = o^ (mod p). 
3. Compute s = kr^(ni - rx) (mod p — 1). 
4. Signature pair (r,s). 
Signature Verification 
1. Verify that 1 < r < p — 1; if not, reject the signature. 
2. Compute Vi = ifr^ (mod p). 
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3. Compute V2 = a^ (mod p). 
4. If Vi = i>2, accept the signature; otherwise, reject the signature. 
In chapter 1, we have mentioned the model of digital signature. Suppose Alice 
wants to send a message to Bob. Alice uses her private key to sign the message 
(or message digest) and Bob uses Alice's public key to verify the signature pair. 
The goal of an adversary is to forge signatures; that is, to produce signatures 
whicli will be accepted as those of some other entity. In general, we can catego-
rize the type of forgery as follows: 
1. total hreak. Aii adversary is either able to compute the private key infor-
mation of the signer, or finds an efficient signing algorithm functionally 
equivalent to the valid signing algorithm. 
2. selective forgery. An adversary is able to create a valid signature for a par-
ticular message or class of messages chosen a priori. Creating the signature 
does not directly involve the legitimate signer. 
3. existential forgery. An adversary is able to forge a signature for at least one 
message. The adversary has little or no control over the message whose 
signature is obtained, and the legitimate signer iriay be involved in the 
deception. 
Total hreak in ElGamal signature scheme equals to the solving of discrete log-
arithm problem. Some algorithms (baby-step giant step, Pollard's p, Pohlig-
Hellman and index-calculus) have been covered in chapter 2. Chapter 4 will 
discuss another method, which can also solve the discrete logarithm. 
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Selective forgery is possible in the ElGamal signature scheme. These cases 
are now discussed. 
3.2 ElGamal signature without hash function 
The ElGamal signature scheme presented in the previous section doesn't employ 
any hash function on the message m. Iii practice, a hash function should be 
applied to the message rn iii the signature generation step. We will discuss why 
the hash function is needed in this section. 
Siipi)ose we alreaxly have a valid signature pair (r, s) oii the message m, we can 
make nse of this signature pair to reproduce another valid signature pair on 
sorrie messages as follows: 
Select integers A, B, and C arbitrarily such that (Ar - Cs) is relatively prime 
to p — 1. Set 
r' = rAa!3yC (inod p), (3.1) 
s' = r's/(Ar - Cs) ( r n o d p - 1), (3.2) 
rn' = r ' (Am + B s ) / ( A r - C s ) (mod p- 1). (3.3) 
Then the {r', s') are a valid signature pair on message m'. 
To see how we can get this r', s' and 7n', here is my derivation. First, w() assume 
that r' is controlled by three variables, r, a and y, so we set 
r' = r^a^y^ (mod p) (3.4) 
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If (r ' ,s ') is a valid signature pair on message m', then it should satisfy 
« 爪 ' = / r ' s ' (mod p) 
= y ' ' ( r ^ a ^ ^ f Y ' (mod p) 
= / + c " A s ' a B s ' ( m � d p ) (3.5) 
If we can express yr'+Cs'^As' jj^  terms of a powers, then we can found the value 
of m'. To achieve this, we can get some hints from the equation 
' i fr ' = a ^ (3.6) 
So the key is to find an t such that 
yv'+Cs'^As' = (yr—�t (mod p) (3.7) 
To obtain the value of t, first by comparing the coefficients in equation (3.7), we 
have 
r' + Cs' = rt (mod p - 1) 
As' = st (mod p 一 1) (3.8) 
Therefore, 
r's + Css' = Ars' (rnod p — 1) 
{Ar — Cs)s' = r's (mod p — 1) 
s' 二 J ^ ^ ( m o d p - l ) (3.9) 
Once s' is found, we can find t from (3.8) 
J^j-! 
t ' = 如 _ c s ( m o d p - l ) (3.10) 
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Therefore, the value of m' can be found in equation (3.5) 
a^' = . i / + C s ? s � B s ' (modp) 
= ( y W f a ^ ' ' (mod p) 
= { a ^ f a^'' (mod p) (3.11) 
Therefore, m' is 
m' = rnt + Bs' (mod p - 1) 
^ y ' r's 
= m - — + B- — (mod p - 1) 
Ar - Cs Ar - Cs ^ ‘ 
r'[Am + B s ) , , � ， � 
= ^ r - C . ( m o d p - l ) (3.12) 
Here the (r', s') is a valid signature pair on message m'. Note that in this forgery, 
we can only sign a particular type of message, which is specified iii equation (3.3). 
So it is a kind of selective forgery. There is one interesting thing, if we set A = 0 
in equation (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3), we have 
r' = a.ByC (mod p) 
s' = —r'C (mod p — 1) 
m' = -r'BjC (mod p - 1) (3.13) 
It means that we can generate legitimate signatures without knowing any sig-
natures in prior. 
In order to prevent such selective forgery, we can apply a hash function on the 
message in the signature generation step. That is, the signature generation step 
will become 
s = kr^[h{m) — rx] (mod p — 1) (3.14) 
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instead of 
s = kr^[m — rx] (mod p — 1) (3.15) 
If no hash function is used, such forgery is possible for soine particular messages 
rn. If hash function is used, such forgery is possible for some particular h(m). 
Owing to the nature of hash function, it is difficult to find the message m frorn 
h{m,). Therefore, such type of forgery can be avoided. 
3.3 Security of ElGamal signature scheme 
In this section, some security issues of ElGamal signature scheme will be dis-
cussed. 
1. Sarne k cannot be used twice; otherwise, we can probably calculate the 
private key x of the signer. Suppose the signer generate two signature 
pairs (r, ,s'i) and (r, S2) with the sarne A;, so we have 
si = A;-i {h{m,i) — rx} (mod p 一 1) (3.16) 
and 
S2 = kr^ {h{m2) - rx} (rnod p - 1) (3.17) 
Then, 
{si — s2)k = h(m,i) — J1(m2) (mod p — 1) (3.18) 
If gcd(si - S 2 , p - 1) = 1，then 
k = 7 ~ ~ - ~ " r [h{rni) — /1(m2)] (mod p — 1) (3.19) 
1^ 1 一 S2) 
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Once k is known, we can solve for x by substituting it into either equation 
(3.16) or (3.17). Therefore, 
. = — i ) � 列 ' ( m o d p - l ) (3.20) 
or 
•X 二 ' — ) , S2k' ( , n o d p - l ) (3.21) 
2. It is important that the verifier checks whether 1 < r < p is satisfied. If 
this check is not done, we can produce another signature pair (r2, S2) 011 
message m,2 if we have a valid signature pair (r! ,Si) on message rui at 
hand. 
Proof. If /i(mi)-i (mod p — 1) exists, set 
u = "(m2)"(m1)_1 (mod p — 1) (3.22) 
Now (T2,6'2) can be found by setting 
S2 = siu ( m o d p - 1) (3.23) 
ancl by computing r2 satisfying 
r2 = riu (mod p — 1) (3.24) 
r2 = n (mod p) (3.25) 
r*2 can be found by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This (r2, S2) 
is a valid signature pair on message ni2 because 
j p r ' 2 ' = ' � r f K (mod p) 
= (以 � 1 々广 （mod p) 
= « ' — 1 ) " (mod p) 
= c / — (mod p) (3.26) 
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3. This is the case for discrete logarithm at GF(2") . If the extension polyno-
mial is ,T" +:r + l and a is a root of this polynomial. Suppose the signature 
r = (1,1，.. ., 1), we can solve for k since 
f y n _ | _ 1 
l + tt + ... + a"-i = ^ — c\ + 1 
Q. 
— Q f " 
= c v i - n (3.27) 
Generally, if the public key (1,1，. • •，1), then we can solve the private key 
easily. 
3.4 Bleichenbacher's Attack 
In [3], it shows that forgery is possible if tlie prime number p or the generator 
« are not chosen carefully. First, we will present the Bleichenbacher's attack 
011 ElGamal signature scheme and show that such attack can be extended to 
variations of the ElGamal signature scheme. 
Theorem 3.4.1 Letp- 1 二 biv where b is smooth and let y be the public key of 
user A. If a generator p = cw with 0 < c < b and an integer t are known such 
that 卢力=a (m,od p), then a valid ElGamal signature (r, s) on a given h can be 
found. 
Proof. The equation 
“概三！广(mod p) (3.28) 
can be solved for z. Since « is the generator of the group Z* with order p - 1, 
then the subgroup H generated by a'" has a smooth order b. Therefore, we caii 
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use the algorithm of Pohlig and Hellman to solve the above equation. 
Now let 
r = |3 (mod p) (3.29) 
and 
s = t(h — cwz) (mod p - 1) (3.30) 
This (r, s) is a valid signature pair on message h since 
r Y = ( " 7 一 ( " 广 ( m o d p) 
= « ' 卜 隱 广 （ m o d p ) 
= « ' ' (mod p) (3.31) 
Corollary 3.4.1 Ifa is smooth and dividesp-1, then it is possible to generate 
a valid ElGamal signature. 
Proof. Let ^ = {p — l)/a and t = (p — 3)/2. Then /3^  = ( - l ) / 3 " i = a ( m o d p). 
Thus it follows by Theorem 3.4.1 that signatures can be forged. 
We can see that forgery can be possible even if we have applied the liash function 
to the message. The probability of finding a generator |3 depends on the value 
of b. If b is small, then it is unlikely that we will find a generator. Moreover, 
the generator a should be chosen carefully such that it does not divide p — 1. 
Since p and a are shared among several users. These parameters are usually 
generated from an authority. With the Bleichenbacher's attack, an authority 
can generate a trapdoor prime in which the |3 and t can be found easily. T w o 
different methods to generate this trapdoor are shown here. 
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3.4.1 Constructing trapdoor 
Method A When p is fixed and p - 1 = bw with b smooth, then we can find a , 
P and t in the following way (provided that b is not too small). 
1. Choose c e { 1 , . . •, b - 1} randomly \intil /3 = ciu is a generator of Z* 
2. Choose t with gcd(t,p — 1) = 1 
3. Compute o； = |3^ ' 
Method B When the generator a is fixed, then p, p and t can be generated as 
follows 
1. Seloct three positive integers u，v and c siich that v is odd and c"a;" has 
approximately the size of the prime to construct. 
2. Compute tlie smooth divisors of c”a" - 1 
3. If there exists a srnooth divisor d > c of c"tt" - 1 sudi that p = c^a" — d^ 
is prime, ^ — u is relatively prime to p — 1 and a is a generator of Z*, 
then compute 
. p-1 
^ = ' — 
j) — 1 
f' = v ( ^ — — ^ r i ) (mod p - 1) (3.32) 
Since d divides c"a"' — 1 and p — 1 = c^a" — rf — 1, so d also divides p - 1. Thus 
|3 satisfies the precondition of Theorem 3.4.1. Since 
a"c" = d" (mod p) (3.33) 
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we have 
a - " = { c d r ' Y (modp) (3.34) 
Therefore, 
� = ( c ^ y (rnodp) 
= cdr^{p — 1) ” (rnod p) 
= [ — c d ~ ^ y (mod p) 
= ( - 1 ) « " " (rnod p) 
= a ^ - ^ (mod p) (3.35) 
Hence 
pt = a (mod p) (3.36) 
3.5 Extension to Bleichenbacher's attack 
Many variations of the basic ElGamal signature scheme have been proposed and 
some of these variations are also vulnerable by Bleichenbacher's attack. Here is 
iriy extension of Bleichenbacher's attack to these variations. 
In the basic ElGamal signature scheme, after suitable rearrangement, the signing 
equation can be written as 
u = vx + kw (mod p — 1) 
where u — h{rn), v = r, and w = s in the original ElGamal signature schciiie. 
These variations generally involve in permutating the terms u, 'u, and tv in the 
signing equation. Table (3.1) shows the variations of the ElGamal signature 
scheme. 
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3.5.1 Attack on variation 3 
In the variation 3, the signing equation is 
5 = rx + kh{m) (mod p - 1) (3.37) 
and the verification equation is 
y?.�— = a' (mod p) (3.38) 
To forge the signature, we follow the steps as in Bleichenbacher's attack, except 
that 
s = cwz + jh(m,) (mod p - 1) (3.39) 
6 
Proof 
a'=严++'—) (mod p) 
= f t ^ o i " — ) (mod p) 
= ' / , • ) (mod p) (3.40) 
u V w Signing equation Verification 
1 h r s h = rx + ks ~ifr^ = a,!~ 
2 h s r h = sx + kr ifr^ = a^ 
3 s r h(m) s = rx + kh{m) yV'(— = (? 
4 s h{m,) r s = xh[m) + kr 以“(””,_ ^s 
5 T s li{m) r = sx + kh{m) '"V“"” = a^ 
_6__T— Ji{rn) s r - xh(m) + ks 以"(爪)尸-Q；^  
Table 3.1: Variations of the ElGamal signature scheme 
3 8 
Chapter 3 Forging ElGamal Signature 
3.5.2 Attack on variation 5 
In variation 5, the signing equation is 
r = sx + kJi{rn) (inod p - 1) (3.41) 
and tlie verification equation is 
••) 二 ^r (mod p) (3.42) 
Again, to forge the signature, we follow the steps as in Bleichenbacher's attack, 
except that 
rt — h(m) , 
s = ^ " ^ ^ ^ (mod p - 1) (3.43) 
Proof 
ySr— = y ’ r — (mod p) 
(with some prob.) = : „ ) ] " ; . ( m ) ( 腦 ( 1 p) 
r i — h (in) I / � 
= a ~ T ~ r ' _ ( m o d p) 
二 f / r - " ( — r " ( — (morl p) 
= ^ ' ' (rnodp) (3.44) 
3.5.3 Attack on variation 6 
In variation 6, the signing equation is 
r = xh(m) + ks (mod p — 1) (3.45) 
and the verification equation is 
" / — V 二 � r (mod p) (3.46) 
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Similarly, we follow the steps as in Bleichenbacher's attack, except that 
s = f[r — zh{m)] (mod p - 1) (3.47) 
Proof 
yl_V = yh{m)^t[r-zh{m)] (modp) 
= y ' _ ) a ' - z _ ) (mod p) 
= i / ^ ^ ) a ' a - ' ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ( m o d p) 
(with some prob.) = y—a�j-'_�(mod p) 
= t t ' (mod p) (3.48) 
3.6 Digital Signature Standard(DSS) 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the Dig-
ital Signature Algorithm (DSA) in t,lie Digital Signature Standard (DSS), which 
is a part of the U.S. government's Capstone project. DSA is based on the dis-
crete logarithm problem and a variant of the ElGamal signature scheme. It is 
more secure than the ElGamal signature scheme since it chooses the parameters 
carefully such that the attacks described in previous sections do not exist. 
Public Parameters 
1. Select a prime number q, where 2^ ^^  < q < 2 _ . 
2. Select a prirne number p, where 2 " < p < 2' for 512 < 1 < 1024 and 
/ is a multiple of 64 and with the property that q divides {p - 1) 
3. Select an integer g, where 1 < g < p - 1 such that �(P—i)/<? > i (mod 
ri 
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4. Compute a = "(p-1)/9 (mod p), so a is the generator of the cyclic 
group of order q in Z* 
5. Publish p, a 
Key Generation 
1. Randomly generate an integer x, where 0 < x < q 
2. Compute y = a^' (inod p) 
3. Private key: x 
Public key: y 
Signature Generation 
1. Riiii(loinly generate an integer A:, where 0 < k < q 
2. Compute r = {a& (mod p)} (mod q) 
3. Compute kr^ (mod q) 
4. Compute s = kr^{h{m) + rx) (mod q) 
5. Signature pair (r, s) 
Signature Verification 
1. Check whether 0 < r' < q and 0 < s' < q- if either condition is 
violated, reject tlie signature 
2. Compute w = s'—i (mod q) and h(m') 
3. Compute Ui = wh[m!) (mod q) and U2 = r'w (mod q) 
4. Compute v =[仅“”广(mod p)](mod q) 
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5. If V — r', accept the signature 
Now, we want to prove that the above signature verification works, i.e., if m = 
m', r = r' and s = s', then v = r'. We need the following result to proceed. 
Lemma 3.6.1 Let p and q be primes such that q divides p - 1，g is a positive 
mteger less than p, and a 二 g(p-^)/^ (mod p). Then a^ 二 1 (mod p), and if 
m = n (mod q), then a^ = a^ (modp) 
Proof. 
«" = {"(P-i)/”<7 (mod p) 
= g P - i (mod p) 
= 1 (mod p) (3.49) 
If rn = n (mod q), then m = n + kq for some integer k. 
� m 二 ^n+fc, (mod p) 
= a " a h (mod p) 
= c v " ( a ^ ) ' (mod p) 
= « ' ' ( m o d p ) (3.50) 
Theorem 3.6.1 Ifm = m!, r = r' and s = s' m the signature verification, then 
V = r'. 
Proof. We liavo 
w -- s'-i (rnod q) 
= ' s - i (mod g) (3.51) 
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'U'i = wh{m!) (mod q) 
=wh{m) (mod q) (3.52) 
U'2 = r'w (inod q) 
= r w (mod q) (3.53) 
Now, 
V = K'M/^(mod p)](mod q) 
= K " ( — � ( m o d p ) ] ( m o d q ) 
=K' '-^^^cv^""(mod p)](mod q) 
= [ a ( " ( - ) + - ) - ( m o d p)](mod q) (3.54) 
and 
s = k_i lh(rn) + rx] (mod q) (3.55) 
Hence 
w = A;["(m) + rx]~^ (mod q) 
w[h{m,) + rx] = k (rnod q) (3.56) 
Thus by the lemma 
V = a^(mod p) (mod q) 
= r (mod q) 
= r ' (mod q) (3.57) 
Here is an example of typical DSS signature generation [7]. The prime modulus 
'p chosen is 
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P = 7 434 410 770 759 874 867 539 421 675 728 577 177 024 889 699 
586 189 000 788 950 934 679 315 164 676 852 047 058 354 758 883 
833 299 702 695 428 196 962 057 871 264 685 291 775 577 130 504 
050 839 126 673 
and the prime divisor of p — 1，q is 
Q = 1 138 656 671 590 261 728 308 283 492 178 581 223 478 058 193 
247 
Therefore, {p — l)/q is 
{P - l )Ai = 6 529 106 583 441 773 144 705 959 127 165 952 066 964 
259 152 507 339 624 395 270 343 160 295 123 275 238 619 980 855 
555 928 611 777 361 776 
The generator for the cyclic subgroup of order q in Z；, « is 
« = 5 154 978 420 348 751 798 752 390 524 304 908 179 080 782 918 
903 280 816 528 537 868 887 210 221 705 817 467 399 501 053 627 
846 983 235 883 800 157 945 206 652 168 013 881 208 773 209 963 
452 245 182 466 
The private key, .T, is 
•^  = 185 200 992 879 430 349 246 928 890 763 396 348 557 950 060 
052 
Then the public key, /5 = a^ is 
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3 = 1 313 262 929 912 132 563 149 647 614 777 216 522 615 273 453 
570 746 151 675 467 137 191 353 050 812 753 072 254 631 435 649 
494 300 072 321 220 858 192 262 592 093 219 893 426 623 085 296 
074 200 376 115 
Signature generation Assume the hashed message, h(m) is 
Mm) = 968 236 873 715 988 614 170 569 073 515 315 707 566 766 
479 517 
We randomly generate an integer, k 
k = 305 736 015 983 784 127 425 204 148 486 426 464 792 703 852 
479 
Then r=[cv& (mod p)] (mod q) is 
r - 797 387 772 302 493 209 021 291 765 790 742 058 535 532 839 
360 
The inverse of k 
A:-i = 76 032 227 071 633 570 089 031 757 830 396 511 732 987 263 
255 
So 
s = 376 128 930 725 767 930 183 372 771 997 677 399 746 658 752 
712 
8tgnaiure venficaUon Calculate w = s'_i (mod q) 
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w = 901 773 569 445 286 146 281 696 254 684 032 552 931 964 781 
595 
ui = w • h{m/) (mod q) and 
ui = 1 092 677 610 583 452 800 814 993 273 503 516 509 004 891 
674 269 
'u,2 = r'w (mod q) 
/7,2 = 742 761 371 689 099 697 708 866 970 523 451 752 290 280 404 
144 
Compute V = {a"'^ y"'^ (mod p) } (mod q) 
y = 797 387 772 302 493 209 021 291 765 790 742 058 535 532 839 
360 
which is equal to r, so we accept this signature. 
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Quadratic Field Sieve 
4.1 Quadratic Field 
In this chapter, integers in quadratic field will be used in the number field sieve 
to solve the discrete logarithm problem. First we will have some introduction of 
the qiiadmtic field. 
Theorem 4.1.1 An algebraic number of the form a + b^D where a and b are 
'raMonal numbers and D is a squarefree integer form,s a quadratic field and it is 
denoted as Q(\/D). 
Let a ^ b V D and c ^ d y / D are the algebraic numbers in the quadratic field. The 
fom. arithmetic operations in quadratic field are defined as 
(a + 6 v ^ ) i ( c + fiK/^) = (c/,±c) + (6±^i)y；^ 
(a + h\/D){c + d\/^) 二 (ac + bdD) + (ad + bc)y/B 
� ‘ + by/D _ ac - bdD bc — ad 厂 
c + dy/D 二 c2 - d?D + c^-(PD (4.1) 
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As D is a square-free integer, c^  - d^D will always + 0, except when c = d = 
0. Thus all divisions by c + d \ f ^ can be carried out, except the division by 
( )+ i)y/D = 0, the zero element of the field. Since the result of any arithmetic 
operation can always be reduced to p + qy/D, with p aiid q rational numbers, 
the domain is closed under arithmetic operations, and it is thiis a field. 
4.1.1 Integers of Quadratic Field 
The integers in the quadratic field is defined as 
Definition 4.1.1 The number z is sa.id to be an integer of the quadratic field 
Q(v^D) if it satisfies a quadratic equation of the form 
z^ +pz + q = 0 (4.2) 
7"//,ere coefficients p and q are ratwnal mtegers^. 
Theorem 4.1.2 The integers ofQ{VD) are of the form x = r + sp for r and 
s heing arbitrary ratwnal integers, and where 
\/D ifD = 2 or = 3 (mod 4) 
p = (4 3) 
� = ^ ^ tfD = l (mod4) . 
Proof. If the number z = r + s^/D is a solution of the quadratic equation in 
(4.2), then 
(z — r f = Ds^ (4.4) 
That is 
2^ - 2rz + r2 — Ds^ = 0 (4.5) 
1 To avoid imhecilit,y, we shall call the ordinary integers r a t i o n a l i n t e g e r s 
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By comparing equation in (4.2) and (4.5)，-2r and r^ — Ds^ should be integers. 
Piitting r = a/2 for integer a, 2r is always a rational integer and 
— - Ds' 二 j 一 Ds" (4.6) 
is a rational integer if either 
1. a is even, in this case r and s are rational integers, or 
2. a is o(ld, in this case, a,2/4 = 1/4 (mod 1), and Ds^ = 1/4 (mod 1). This 
condition is satisfied if s = 1/2 (mod 1) and D = 1 (mod 4). 
Therefore, combining these cases, we lia,ve the above theorem. 
Some examples of the integers in quadratic field are: the integers in Q(\/T) are 
simply called rational integers, and the integers in Q ( v / ^ ) are called Gaussian 
integers. 
4.1.2 Primes in Quadratic Field 
Definition 4.1.2 The number x = a + b^/D and x = a — 6 y ^ are called 
conjugate numbers in Q(VD) 
Definition 4.1.3 The norm, o.fx m Q{VD) is 
N{x) = XX (4.7) 
Definition 4.1.4 If x is an integer ofQ{VD) and 
N(x) = 土1 (4.8) 
then X is called a unit of Q(^/D). 
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Definition 4.1.5 If the integer a ofQ{y/D) cannot be decomposed as a = j5^, 
皿仇 ^ o.nd 7 integers ofQ{VD), unless one of3 or 7 is a umt，then a is sa.%d 
to he a pnm,e ofQ(VD). Otherwise a is said to be composite m Q{VD) 
Definition 4.1.6 An integral domain D m which factorisation into irreducible 
elements is possible, and all such factonsaMons are umque, is called a unique 
factorisation domain. 
The algebraic integers in an arbitrary quadratic field do not necessary have 
unique factorisations. There are exactly 25 quadratic fields in which there exists 
uniqiie factorisations: they are -163, -67，-43, -19, -11 , -7, -3，-2, -1，2，3，5, 6，7, 
11, 13, 17, 19，21, 29, 33, 37，41, 57, and 73 [10]. 
4.2 Number Field Sieve 
The number field sieve runs sub-exponential time in solving discrete logarithm 
problem. This method is similar to the index-calculus in which they both have 
the factor base. First, we will give a sketch of the algorithm. The number field 
sieve is based on the fact that: 
Theorem 4.2.1 Suppose the discrete logarithm problem, is log^ b. Let q he a 
p n m e dmi,sor ofp — 1. If we are able to find s,t G Z，with t copnme to q 
satisfying the property 
n'l/ = w^ (modp) (4.9) 
/or som,e w, then we can compute x rnod q. 
Proof. Since if (4.9) holds, then 
^'^'" = w ' ( m o d p ) (4.10) 
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Since a is the generator, we can let w = a\ then (4.10) can be written as 
广=0,叫(rnod p) (4.11) 
Therefore, 
6" + tx = iq (mod p - 1) (4.12) 
Since q is a factor of p — 1, 
s + tx = 0 (mod q) (4.13) 
Therefore, we can compute x rnod q where 
X = — s f i (rnod q) (4.14) 
Construction of the number field The number field sieve is based on the 
ol)servation that it is possible to construct a number field K — Q(a) and a ring 
hornomorphism ip from Z[a] of K to Z / n Z such that (^(a) = m (mod p). To 
generate the number field, we need an irreducible polynomial 
f { X ) = X" + (in-iX^-' + ... + aiX + ao (4.15) 
We restrict the degree of f(X) to be two, i.e., we use the integers in quadratic 
field. The reason is that: The algorithm runs better if the mimber field is a 
unique factorisation domain. There are only 25 quadratic fields wliicli liave 
imiqiie factorisation (k)maiii. We can save soiiie tiine in soardiing a ftd(l tliat 
Tiioets this requireiiioiit. 
In order to construct the ring lioinornorphism, we have to find a m such that 
/(m) = 0 (mod p) (4.16) 
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Choose the factor base In the second stage, we have to choose two factor 
bases. The first factor base B j consists of small primes, including a and b. The 
second factor base B2 consists of those prime with small iiorin iii the quadratic 
field. 
Sieving step The sieving step involves the concept of smoothness, here are the 
definitions of smoothness for both rational integers and algebraic integers. 
Definition 4.2.1 A mtional integer is called B-smooth if every prime number 
dividing it is a,t most B 
Definition 4.2.2 An algebraic integer is called B-smooth if every prime number 
dividing its norm is at most B 
The sieving step determines a set T of pairs (c, d) such that 
1. the rational integer (c + dm,) is Bi-smooth 
2. the algebraic integer (c + da) is B2-srn00th 
Linear algebra Use the Lanczos algorithm to determine a subset S C T such 
that 
1. n(cfi)es((: + dTn') is only divisible by a aiicl b 
2. n(c/iOes^(c + d'a) is a q-th power in Z[o; 
Compute result After having accomplished this, we achieve congruence (4.9) 
via 
a”/ = J | (c + dm,) 
(c,d)€S 
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= v^(c + da) 
{c,d)es 
= 綱 
= w ^ (mod p) (4.17) 
4.3 Solving Sparse Linear Equations Over Fi-
nite Fields 
The system of linear equations collected in nurnber field sieve are generally very 
large. These systems cannot be solved using ordinary linear algebra techniques, 
(lue to both tirne and space constraints. However, the equations generated are 
extremely sparse, there are only a few non-zero coefficients per equation. Here 
are some methods to solve the sparse rnatrix. 
4.3.1 Lanczos and conjugate gradient methods 
Suppose that we have to solve the system 
Ax = b (4.18) 
for a column n-vect,oi. .T, where A is a symmetric n x n matrix, and b is a given 
column n-vector. Let 
bo = h, (4.19) 
ci = Abo, (4.20) 
"1 = ^ i - ^ ^ ' ' ^ o , (4.21) 
< ^ , c i > 
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and then, for i > 1, define 
Q+i = 我 （4.22) 
/> . < C,+ i ,Q+i > < f ^ ^ h C ^ , � 
Oi+i = C,+1 k ； ^z-i (4.23) 
< 6 u C i + i > < Oi_i,Q > 
The algorithm stops when it finds a b] that is conjugate to itself, i.e., such that 
< bj, Abj > = 0. This happens for some j < n. If Wj = 0，then 
j-i 
x = J 2 d A (4.24) 
t=0 
is a solution, where 
, < bi, b > , � 
(k = ~ ~ r ^ — — 4.25 
<~，Q+i> 
(If Wj / 0, the algorithm fails) 
The Lanczos algorithm was invented to solve systems with real coefficients. To 
solve systems over finite fields, we can just apply the above equations to a finite 
field situation. [12] discusses some solutions when the matrix is not square. 
4.3.2 Structured Gaussian Elimination 
The basic idea of the structured Gaussian elimination is to declare some columns 
with rnany non-zero coefficients as heavy, and those with few non-zero coefficients 
as light. 
1- Delete all columns which have a single nonzero coefficient and the rows 
iii which those columns have nonzero coefficients. Repeat this step until 
there are no niore columns with a single nonzero entry. 
2. Select those aM columns which have the largest number of nonzero ele-
ments for some a > 0. Call these columns "heavy", the others "light". 
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Typical value of a might be 1/32. The entries in the "heavy" columns 
for every given row might be stored on a disk, with a pointer attached to 
the row list indicating the storage location. These pointers would have 
coefficients attached to them, which are set to 1 initially. The weight of 
a row is then defined as the number of nonzero coefficients in its "light" 
columns. 
3. Eliminate variables corresponding to rows of weight 1 by subtracting ap-
propriate multiples of those rows from other rows that have nonzero coeffi-
cients corresponding to those variables. If u times row i is to be subtracted 
from row j , the pointers attached to row j are to have added to them the 
pointers of row i, with their coefficients multiplied by u. Repeat this step 
until there are no more rows of weight 1. At the end of this process there 
are likely to be many more equations than unknowns. 
4. If r rows are excess, drop the r rows with highest weight. 
4.3.3 Wiedemann Algorithm 
Let the linear equations to be solved is 
Ax = 6, 
where A is a sparse non-singular n x n matrix. Let the minimal polynomial of 
A be f(z), where 
d 
f ( z ) = Y l c , z ^ (4.26) 
j=0 
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for d < n, Co / 0. By the definition of the minimal pohaiomial, 
d 




X > A ^ 6 = 0 
.7=0 
d 
Y 2 CjA^b + Cob = 0 
.7 = 1 
d 
b = -CQ^^CjA^b 
j=i 
- d -
= “ 4 — C o - i f c j A ^ - 1 6 (4.28) 
. i=i . 
Then we can obtain the solution 
d 
X = - C Q ^ ^ C j A ^ - ^ (4.29) 
j=i 
In general, we use the Structured Gaussian Elimination to reduce the size of 
matrix. And then we can apply either the Wiedemann or Lanczos algorithm to 




Cryptography is a strict discipline, in the sense that the parameters used in the 
cryptographic algorithins should be carefully chosen. Otherwise, it may pose 
some security holes for the attacker to break in the system. For example, we 
liave discussed the ElGamal signature scheme in chapter 3. 
1. A hash function should be applied to the message first in the signature gen-
eration, otherwise, we can generate a valid signature pair without knowing 
the private key of signer. 
2. When we receive the signature, we should check that r should be less than 
!)• 
3. A different k should be selected for each message to be signed. Otherwise, 
t,he private key of tlie signer can be probably recovered. 
4. The prime number should be large enough to prevent the index-calculus 
attack. 
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5. p - 1 should contain a large prime factor q, to prevent the Pohlig-Hellrnan 
attack. 
6. Frorn the Bleichenbacher's attack, the generator a chosen should not divide 
P-L 
This thesis extends the Bleichenbacher's attack to the variations of the ElGamal 
signature scheme. However, such types of attack often impose a stricter condi-
tion. 
The Digital Signature Standard is a more secure version of digital signature 
than ElGarnal signature scheme. It is because the prime mimber p contains 
at least a large prime q, which can prevent some attacks like index-calculus, 
Pohlig-Hellman and Bleichenbacher. But with the advance of the computing 
technology, the prime should go beyond one thousand to two thousand bits. 
In chapter 4, we have discussed a special kind of niirnber field sieve - the inte-
gers iii quadratic field. The use of quadratic integers facilitates the searching for 
unique factorisation domain (since in quadratic field, there are oiily 25 unique 
factorisation domain). In using the number field sieve, we have to deal with a 
large and sparse matrix. It will be tirne-consiirning if we just use orcliiiaiy Gaus-
sian elimination to solve such matrix. Therefore, some techniques like Lanczos 
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